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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE, COMMUNITY
EMPOWERMENT AND THE ROLE OF LAWYERS
IN POST-KATRINA NEW ORLEANS
Janell Smith & Rachel Spector*
Wen the mainstream national environmental groups pair up with en-
vironmental justice groups that have the ability to mobilize large num-
bers of constituents-to get people marching and filling up those
courtrooms and city council meetings-that's when you can talk about
an environmental movement.'
I. INTRODUCTION: HURRICANE KATRINA AND THE
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE MOVEMENT
Working together toward a common goal often requires mo-
bilizing the strength and energy of many groups of people, all of
whom share the same passion for accomplishing that goal. Hurri-
cane Katrina and its devastating effect on the environment and
communities in New Orleans and the Gulf Coast has done exactly
that, bringing together numerous coalitions of concerned individu-
als who share the determination to clean up and improve New Or-
leans and the Gulf region. This Article addresses how lawyers from
around the country can work with local advocates on reconstruc-
tion efforts in New Orleans in a way that increases, rather than
undermines, community empowerment. While the Article focuses
on environmental justice advocacy, it defines the concept broadly
with the understanding that adequate housing, opportunities for
employment and economic stability, and an effective political voice
are just as important as neighborhoods free from toxic pollution.
A. When the Local Becomes National
Environmental justice has been formally defined as the fair
treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless of
race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the develop-
* Janell Smith, Vermont Law School, J.D. Candidate 2007; Rachel Spector, City
University of New York School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2007. The Authors are grateful
for the inspiration and assistance of Albert Huang, Environmental Justice Attorney at
the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC).
1 Gregory Dicum, Justice in Time, GRIST MAC., Mar. 14, 2006, http://www.grist.
org/news/maindish/2006/03/14/dicum/ (interview with Robert Bullard, "the father
of environmental justice").
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ment, implementation, and enforcement of environmental laws,
regulations, and policies. 2 The environmental justice movement is
a community-led response to the disproportionate levels of envi-
ronmental pollution and degradation in communities of color and
low-income communities in the United States and across the
globe .'
The environmental justice movement began in the early 1980s
as a loose coalition of various minority and low-income communi-
ties across the nation and focused on local issues of pollution and
poor health.4 In 1991, the similarities among these community
struggles led to the organization and meeting of the First National
People of Color Environmental Leadership Summit in Washing-
ton, D.C.5 The Summit's 600 participants included African Ameri-
cans, Latino Americans, Asian Americans, and Native Americans
from across the United States and other countries who "struck out
at environmental racism and committed themselves to a new move-
ment-a movement for environmental justice."6 To accomplish
the goal of environmental justice, the participants "depart[ed]
from the goals of national environmental groups" which "turned
struggles over pure air and water into lifeless technical debates
about balancing risks and costs."7 Instead, participants made it
their goal to address issues more in tune with "personal human
2 United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, Environmental Justice, http://www.epa.gov/
compliance/environmentaljustice/index.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2006).
3 See, e.g., COMM. FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, A NATIONAL
REPORT ON THE RACIAL & SoCIo-EcONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH
HAzARDoUs WASTE SITES (1987) (groundbreaking report on the disproportionate im-
pact of environmental degradation on low-income people and people of color); cf.
MANUEL PASTOR ET. AL., IN THE WAKE OF THE STORM: ENVIRONMENT, DISASTER & RACE
AFTER KATRINA (2006) (studying racial disparities in environmental health after Hurri-
cane Katrina).
4 Robert Bullard, Environmental Justice in the 21st Century, Environmental Jus-
tice Resource Center, http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/ejinthe21stcentury.htm (last visited
Dec. 18, 2006) (providing history of the environmental justice movement and how it
started in Warren County, North Carolina).
5 See Keith Schneider, Minorities Join to Fight Polluting Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1991, at A20.
6 Id. Environmental racism is defined as "racial discrimination in environmental
policy making and the enforcement of regulations and laws; the deliberate targeting
of people of Colour communities for toxic and hazardous waste facilities; the official
sanctioning of the life-threatening presence of poisons and pollutants in our commu-
nities; and the history of excluding people of colour from the leadership of the envi-
ronmental movement." Deborah M. Robinson, Environmental Racism: Old Wine in a
New Bottle, World Council of Churches, http://www.wcc-coe.org/wcc/what/jpc/
echoes/echoes-17-02.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2006) (explaining the growth of the
environmental justice movement in the United States and internationally).
7 Schneider, supra note 5.
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values, like justice, health and race."8 Although the Summit estab-
lished a national coalition, the issues, goals, and leadership of the
environmental justice movement remain largely local.
The focus on local leadership and community empowerment
is reflected in the Principles of Environmental Justice, a seventeen-
point set of objectives adopted at the Summit which guide environ-
mental justice work.9 The Principles articulate the movement's
aim to "include not only equal protection from environmental
risks, or life and health issues, but also the right for people to live
in communities that are environmentally safe, regardless of their
race or income."' ° Recognizing the great importance of local in-
volvement and leadership" and the need for direct action at the
grassroots level to accomplish environmental objectives, 12 the Prin-
ciples emphasized the rights of individuals to live and work in "safe
and healthy . . . environment[s] . . free from environmental
hazards,"'13 as well as "the right to participate as equal partners at
every level of decision-making including needs assessment, plan-
ning, implementation, enforcement and evaluation."' 4 The Princi-
ples of Environmental Justice laid the foundation for a movement
built on community empowerment.
In a shift from the local nature and appeal of environmental
justice issues, Hurricane Katrina, the category-five hurricane that
hit the Gulf Coast and New Orleans in August 2005, broadcast the
issue of environmental justice to a vast national audience. While
the problems affecting the region were local, the publicity sur-
rounding the crisis was international, and national environmental
organizations and other national groups quickly mobilized their re-
sources and expertise toward the cleanup effort in New Orleans.
8 Id.
9 See Environmental Justice Resource Center, Principles of Environmental Justice,
available at http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/princej.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2006) (com-
plete list of Principles of Environmental Justice) [hereinafter Principle or Principles].
10 R. Gregory Roberts, Environmental Justice and Community Empowerment: Learning
From the Civil Rights Movement, 48 Am. U. L. REv. 229, 265 n. 200 (quoting Deeohn
Ferris & David Hahn-Baker, Environmentalists and Environmental Justice Policy, in ENWr-
RONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS 66, 66 (Bunyan Bryant ed.
1995)).
11 See generally, Regina Austin & Michael Shill, Black, Brown, Red, and Poisoned, in
UNEQUAL PROTECTION: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR 53,
57-65 (Robert Bullard, ed. 1994) [hereinafter UNEQUAL PROTECTION].
12 See id. at 63-64 (discussing the importance of direct action, including "a pano-
ply of legal and extralegal activities such as circulating petitions; holding demonstra-
tions, marches, and sit-ins; conducting candidate and agency accountability sessions
... ; and picketing shareholders' meetings.").
13 See Principles, supra note 9 (Principle #8).
14 Id. (Principle #7).
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Many outside groups and volunteers sought to collaborate with lo-
cal grassroots organizations in their work in the Gulf Coast region.
Such efforts have a checkered history because past collabora-
tion between local activists and outside lawyers has often been im-
balanced or unsuccessful;1" this has lead local environmental
justice advocates to mistrust national environmental organiza-
tions.1 6 Traditionally, much of their work together has been in the
context of case-specific litigation, where the national organizations'
lawyers would often bring litigation without consulting the commu-
nities directly affected by it or leave after the case was over, regard-
less of whether the community actually had achieved a satisfactory
result.17 The failure of national environmental groups to commit
fully to community-driven efforts often did not empower the com-
munity and in some cases left it worse off than it was before.18 Re-
cently, national environmental groups have incorporated the spirit
and principles of the environmental justice movement into their
missions, proactively collaborating with community groups without
undermining local leadership.19 Those organizations, and other
lawyers and activists trained in the environmental justice move-
ment, have brought an important sensitivity to community leader-
ship while working on environmental and rebuilding issues in New
Orleans and the Gulf Region following Katrina.
This Article describes several recent advocacy and environ-
mental justice projects in New Orleans in which communities are
working with lawyers and scientists from around the country and
offers lessons for successful local-national collaborative environ-
mental justice advocacy. Part I gives some background on environ-
mental advocacy issues in the New Orleans region and the impact
of Hurricane Katrina. Part II illustrates the difficulties communi-
ties have had challenging environmental justice problems through
traditional legal action. Part III describes partnerships between the
15 See Bill Quigley, Reflections of Community Organizers: Lawyering for Empowerment of
Community Organizations, 21 OHio N.U. L. REv. 455 (1994) (stories from community
organizers about their experiences working with lawyers).
16 See Luke W. Cole, Empowerment as the Key to Environmental Protection: The Need for
Environmental Poverty Law, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 619 (1992).
17 Id.
18 See generally, Quigley, supra note 15.
19 For example, the Natural Resources Defense Council's mission statement now
includes the following: "We work to foster the fundamental right of all people to have
a voice in decisions that affect their environment. We seek to break down the pattern
of disproportionate environmental burdens borne by people of color and others who
face social or economic inequities." NRDC: Mission Statement, http://www.nrdc.
org/about/mission.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
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NRDC 2° and local environmental organizations21 that resulted in a
community-led testing and cleanup of toxic sediments and success-
ful opposition to a landfill in a residential neighborhood. Part IV
discusses a nationwide network of law students and New Orleans
residents called Matchmakers for Justice, which is advocating to se-
cure the basic needs of returning residents. 22 Finally, Part V briefly
describes the issues that New Orleans residents will continue to
face in the future and offers recommendations for attorneys and
other advocates seeking to collaborate with community
organizations.
B. The Environmental Impacts of Katrina
New Orleans' long history of racial discrimination has led to
some of the nation's most egregious environmental justice
problems. 2 Before World War II, explorers found oil off the coast
of Baton Rouge and built an oil refinery. 24 Louisiana became a
"prime location" for the petrochemical industry,25 and by 1956, pe-
trochemical plants employed 87,200 Louisianans; generous tax ex-
emptions for the industry in the 1960s prompted still more
growth. 26 This economic boom was accompanied by a sharp in-
crease in air pollution: Between 1987 and 1989, more than two bil-
20 The NRDC is a membership organization with 1.2 million members that uses
law, science, and advocacy "to protect the planet's wildlife and wild places and to
ensure a safe and healthy environment for all living things." NRDC: About Us, http://
www.nrdc.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
21 For a list of local organizations, see Nat. Resources Defense Counsel, NRDC
Helps New Orleans Rebuild, and Stay Safe, http://www.nrdc.org/health/effects/new
orleans.asp (last visited Feb. 12, 2007).
22 The Matchmakers forJustice program is a collaborative effort among legal part-
ners and community partners. Through the program, the Student Hurricane Net-
work works with organizations to arrange a network of support structures and services
to residents and law students. See Student Hurricane Network Main Page, http://
www.studenthurricanenetwork.org/main.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
23 See Robert D. Bullard, Environmental Justice for All, in UNEQUAL PROTECTION,
supra note 11, at 3-5 (Robert Bullard ed., 1994) (chronicling the various early cases of
environmental justice that started the movement); see also Liza Featherstone, Race to
the Bottom: Slow Katrina Evacuation Fits Pattern of Injustice During Crises, GRIST MAG.,
Sept. 8, 2005, http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2005/09/08/featherstone-
katrina/index.html (emphasizing that Louisiana has been a "nationally recognized
poster child for environmental injustice .. .for decades").
24 Beverly H. Wright et al., Coping with Poisons in Cancer Alley, in UNEQUAL PROTEC-
TION, supra note 11, at 111 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994). For a compelling story of
one community's fight against oil companies in Cancer Alley, see STEVE LERNER, DIA-
MOND: A STRUGGLE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN LOUISIANA'S CHEMICAL CORRIDOR
(2005).
25 Wright et al., supra note 24, at 111.
26 Id. at 112.
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lion pounds of toxic chemicals were emitted from these plants. 27
The air, ground, and water are still filled with carcinogens,
mutagens, and embryotoxins. 28 Grassroots organizers in New Orle-
ans and along the corridor called "Cancer Alley," where the pe-
trochemical plants are located, have worked to end the pollution. 29
While some battles have been won,3 ° the majority have not.31
Before Hurricane Katrina, the population of New Orleans was
68% African American.3 2 Of the approximately 28% of its re-
sidents living below the poverty line, more than 80% were African
American. 3 The environmental degradation especially worsened
the situation for those living in poverty.
The floodwaters caused by Hurricane Katrina covered residen-
tial neighborhoods in New Orleans and surrounding areas with
mud and sediments from the bottom of Lake Pontchartrain and
industrial sites in the region, precipitating what should have been
"the mother of all toxic cleanups. 34 Six major oil spills occurred
during Katrina, releasing about 60% of the amount of oil leaked
during the Exxon Valdez accident. 5 In addition, about sixty un-
27 Id. at 114.
28 Id.
29 See, e.g., id. at 114-15 (describing the efforts of different Cancer Alley communi-
ties to combat environmental discrimination).
30 For example, in the late 1990s, the Louisiana state government launched an
attack on a community group's access to legal assistance from a local law school's
legal clinic combating environmental injustices; in response to community outrage,
however, the EPA denied state-issued air permits for the construction of a $700 mil-
lion chemical plant. See Marcia Coyle, EPA Move Makes Tulane the Victor, NAT'L L. J.,
Sept. 22, 1997, at A13; cf Marcia Coyle, Governor v. Students in $700M Plant Case: Tu-
lane Law School Clinic Threatens Construction of a Chemical Complex, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 8,
1997, at col. 2 (discussing how Louisiana Governor Murphy Foster tried to stop the
Tulane Environmental Law Clinic from assisting a high-risk community in Convent,
Louisiana in their suit against Shintech, a Japanese-owned company); Robert R.
Kuehn, Denying Access to Legal Representation: The Attack on the Tulane Environmental Law
Clinic, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'v 33 (2000) (detailing the actions of Governor Foster
and other business interests in denying the Convent community access to the clinic's
legal representation).
31 Wright et al., supra note 24, at 117-122 (discussing communities that have won
lawsuits against chemical companies and buy-outs where communities were com-
pletely displaced).
32 Hurricane Katrina: Assessing the Present Environmental Status: Hearing Before the Sub-
comm. on Env't & Hazardous Materials of the Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong.
99 (2005) (statement of Dr. Beverly Wright, Director, Deep South Center for Environ-
mental Justice).
33 Id.
34 Catherine Arnst & Janet Ginsburg, The Mother of All Toxic Cleanups, Bus. WK.,
Sep. 26, 2005, at 42.
35 PASTOR ET AL., supra note 3, at 4.
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derground oil storage tanks were disturbed by the storm.36 The
flooded area included five Superfund toxic waste sites and 466 in-
dustrial facilities where various dangerous chemicals including pes-
ticides were stored.37 This is in addition to an unprecedented
amount of debris.38
In the year since Katrina, local and federal governments have
done little to pursue cleanup strategies that protect residents'
health; moreover, little has been done to plan for similar catastro-
phes in the future. In the aftermath of the hurricanes, for exam-
ple, a number of bills proposed in Congress initially called for the
suspension of many environmental laws. 39 State and federal au-
thorities have largely failed to clean up toxic sediments or pursue
sustainable strategies for dealing with the debris left behind by the
storms. Local community groups have had to step in to protect
themselves and hold the government accountable.
II. STALLED IN THE COURTS
Communities have had limited legal success on traditional
civil rights claims of environmental injustice due to discrimination
based on race and class. In particular, several key civil rights deci-
sions have prevented communities from bringing claims of discrim-
ination against federal agencies.40
Most communities have tried to litigate environmental injus-
tice claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
36 Id. at 29.
37 1d
38 Id.
39 See Louisiana Katrina Reconstruction Act, S. 1765, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill
included waivers of many protections under current environmental laws, such as the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq., beyond the gen-
eral emergency waivers already included in the law. For example, any Army Corps of
Engineers project approved by a newly created and permanent "Pelican Commission"
would be exempted from an environmental review process; in addition, the bill would
have allowed the president to waive any environmental law for any project two years
following Katrina. See generally LINDA LUTHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
NEPA AND HURRICANE RESPONSE, RECOVERY AND REBUILDING EFFORTS, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS (Sept. 28, 2005) (discussing NEPA requirements and the effects of pro-
posed legislation), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/library/online/guides/
disastersFiles/crs-nepaAndHurricaneResponse.pdf.
40 See, e.g., East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning
& Zoning Comm'n, 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989) (finding that county's decision
to allow private landfill in primarily African American census tract was "not motivated
by the intent to discriminate against black persons"), affd, 896 F.2d 1264 (11th Cir.
1989); Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (holding
that plaintiffs failed to establish substantial likelihood of proving that permit to create
solid waste facility was was motivated by purposeful discrimination).
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Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.4 Under the Supreme
Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, however, racial discrimina-
tion on the part of a state actor is unconstitutional only if plaintiffs
show "a racially discriminatory purpose"-intentional discrimina-
tion.4 2 An action will not be held unconstitutional "[s]olely be-
cause it has a racially disproportionate impact."43 Because the
environmental justice movement focuses on disproportionate im-
pact on minority and low-income communities, it is very hard to
meet the intentional discrimination standard.44
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., the Court articulated five factors used to prove discrimina-
tory purpose.45 The court applied those factors in East Bibb Twiggs
Neighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning Commis-
sion and found no discriminatory intent.46 In East Bibb, the plain-
tiffs alleged that "the Commission's decision to allow the creation
of a private landfill in [its] census tract. .. was motivated at least in
part by considerations of race."47 The district court found that the
plaintiffs had shown no "background of discrimination in the Com-
mission's decisions," such as discriminatory statements in the legis-
lative or administrative history, and held that the impact on the
minority community was the result "of necessity" rather than intent
because a large minority population happened to live in the census
tract chosen to house the landfill.48
East Bibb is typical: Most communities cannot meet the inten-
tional discrimination standard because they go to court to combat
discriminatory impact and have little knowledge or interest in the
41 Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection; The Racial Divide in Environmental Law: Lawyers
Try to Devise New Strategy, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 21, 1992, at S8.
42 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
43 Id. The Court went on to say that "[d]isproportionate impact is not irrelevant,
but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution." Id. at 242.
44 Suzanne Smith, Note, Current Treatment of Environmental Justice Claims: Plaintiffs
Face a Dead End in the Courtroom, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 223, 229 (2002).
45 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). The
five factors are: (1) "the impact of the official action" and "whether it 'bears more
heavily on one race than another;'" (2) "the historical background of the decision,"
especially "if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes;" (3)
"[t] he specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision;" (4) whether
there were "substantial departures" from "the normal procedural sequence" in the
making of the decision; and (5) "legislative and administrative history" provided in
statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes of its meetings, or re-
ports." Id. at 266-67.
46 East Bibb Twiggs Neighborhood Ass'n, 706 F. Supp. at 884.
47 Id. at 881.
48 Id. at 886-87.
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intent. The equal protection standard articulated by the Court fo-
cuses on proving discriminatory intent preceding the decision, 49
while plaintiffs look to the subsequent effect that a decision had on
their lives.5" In Washington v. Davis, the Supreme Court stated that
there are "proper circumstances" where "the racial impact of a law,
rather than its discriminatory purpose, is the critical factor."5 Ar-
lington Heights recognized the priority that should be placed on
community impact by naming this factor first.52 Although courts
need not completely abandon an examination of prior actions by a
particular state actor, more weight should be given to the impact
that the decision will have on the community.
In February 1994, the Clinton Administration recognized envi-
ronmental justice as an issue by enacting Executive Order 12,898,
Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations
and Low-Income Populations, which mandates that specific agencies
take action to incorporate environmental justice into their deci-
sion-making. 53 Although the Order formally recognized the issue
of environmental justice and encouraged agencies to take action,
its effectiveness is questionable since it does not bind agencies.54
Even the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) fails to abide by
the intent of the Order.5 5 The lack of movement toward environ-
mental justice after the Order has seriously hindered the progress
of affected communities.
Recognition of the environmental justice issue did not neces-
sarily provide greater protection for community members. The
Order explicitly states that it does not "create any right to judicial
review involving the compliance or non-compliance of the United
States [or] its agencies," but is "intended only to improve the inter-
nal management of the executive branch. '56 Because a citizen can-
49 See Smith, supra note 44, at 235 ("Similar to the Equal Protection cases ...
prevailing on a Title VI [of the Civil Rights Act of 1964] claim has proven difficult
because courts require a plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent.").
50 See, e.g., Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677 (showing that community members in an
action claiming racial discrimination in site selection were concerned about the facil-
ity's effect on "land values, its tax base, its aesthetics, the health and safety of its inhab-
itants, and operation of Smiley High School, located only 1700 feet from the site.").
51 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976).
52 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).
53 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
54 Willie Hernandez, Comment, Environmental Justice: Looking Beyond Executive Order
No. 12,898, 14 UCLAJ. EI, ViTL. L. & POL'Y 181, 206 (1996).
55 ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REP. No. 2006-P-00034,
EPA NEEDS TO CONDUCT ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE REVIEWS OF ITS PROGRAMS, POLICIES,
AND ACTIVITIES (2006).
56 Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. at 7632.
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not bring a suit based on an agency's non-compliance with the
Order, many agencies lack the incentive to take the Order's re-
quirements seriously.17 In general, an executive order has legal au-
thority if: (1) the order was issued pursuant to a statutory mandate
or delegation of authority from Congress, and (2) the order's lan-
guage establishes an intent to create a cause of action.58 Some ex-
ecutive orders have made a larger impact when these two
conditions existed.59 In this case, however, Congress did not dele-
gate authority to the President to issue Executive Order 12,898;
therefore, it does not have the force of law. Although scholars ad-
vocated in favor of amending the Order to include language ex-
plicitly creating a cause of action for affected communities, no
such language was ever added.6 °
Plaintiffs seeking environmental justice also experience diffi-
culty employing Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VI
states that "no person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin be excluded from participation in,
be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. 61
This provision should allow community organizations to bring
claims against any agency receiving federal funds that has discrimi-
nated against them. In 2001, however, the U.S. Supreme Court in
Alexander v. Sandoval held that no private cause of action could be
implied from Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.62 Despite a
prior ruling to the contrary,63 the Court reasoned that Congress
would have explicitly written a private cause of action into the stat-
ute if it intended one to exist.64 After Sandoval, communities could
no longer bring lawsuits under Title VI against any state or local
agencies receiving federal funding that discriminately enforce envi-
ronmental laws.
57 Hernandez, supra note 54, at 206.
58 Id. at 205.
59 See id. at 204, n.140. President Kennedy used an executive order to combat ra-
cial discrimination in federally funded housing, and President Lyndon Johnson is-
sued an executive order to prohibit discrimination in hiring practices. Id.
60 Id. at 207.
61 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2007).
62 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001). In Sandova4 a non-English-speaking citizen brought a
claim against the Alabama Department of Public Safety, which received federal fund-
ing, for discrimination due to its policy of administering driving tests only in English.
Id. at 279.
63 See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979) (holding that plaintiff had
private cause of action against discriminatory universities under Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972).
64 Sandova4 532 U.S. at 286-87.
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Without favorable law available in the courtroom, it is impera-
tive that community members reach beyond the legal system to
gain environmental justice victories. Although lawyers in this field
continue to develop innovative ways of bringing lawsuits to protect
communities across the nation, there is a need to utilize other
means of creating change. If national environmental groups and
other national networks use their resources to support community
organizations, non-legal alternatives for advocacy can be
strengthened.
III. PROTECTING RESIDENTS FROM Toxic SEDIMENTS AND
UNSAFE LANDFILLS
As Katrina's floodwaters receded, residents of New Orleans
sought to ascertain the dangers of a layer of sediment that covered
their yards, sidewalks, and homes. Among other things, they
wanted to know about the impact of massive mold growth to
human health in flooded areas; the safety of New Orleans' drink-
ing water; and the harmful effect of the tons of debris being moved
to landfills located in residential neighborhoods.6"
A. Testing the Soil
Local environmental and community groups requested that
NRDC examine the toxicity of sediments because of inadequate
testing by the Environmental Protection Agency in the fall of
2005.66 NRDC found elevated levels of lead, arsenic, and diesel
fuel contamination prevalent in many neighborhoods; in many
cases, the levels exceeded EPA soil cleanup guidelines.67 Sampling
also revealed high levels of dangerous pesticides such as dichloro
65 Nat. Resources Defense Council, New Orleans Area Environmental Quality Test
Results: Sediment Contamination, http://www.nrdc.org/health/effects/katrinadata/
sediment.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
66 ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT SUMMARY FOR AREAS OF JEF-
FERSON, ORLEANS, ST. BERNARD AND PLAQUEMINES PARISHES FLOODED AS A RESULT OF
HURRICANE KATRINA (2005), http://www.epa.gov/katrina/testresults/katrina env-
assessment-summary.htm. The EPA tested for and found toxins such as lead and
arsenic, pesticides, herbicides, fecal coliform bacteria, PCBs, polynuclear aromatic hy-
drocarbons (PAH), and total petroleum hydrocarbons (TPH). Id. Although some
samples clearly revealed levels of toxic pollutants that far exceeded existing regulation
levels, the EPA concluded that toxins in sediment did not represent a significant
health hazard and recommended "routine" health and safety precautions such as fre-
quent hand washing. Id. Similarly in December 2005, the Louisiana Department of
Environmental Quality announced that there was "no unacceptable health risk" from
sediments deposited by Katrina. Id.
67 Nat. Resources Defense Council, supra note 65 (noting that the average level of
arsenic in Orleans Parish was more than thirty-one times the EPA soil cleanup level).
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diphenyl trichloroethane, commonly known as DDT, in a residen-
tial area where an abandoned pesticide-blending plant was lo-
cated. 68 Finally, leachate from the Agriculture Street Landfill, a
Superfund toxic waste site, was seeping into the yard of a senior
citizens' center, leaving carcinogens in excess of EPA guidelines.69
NRDC's analysis of EPA's sampling data confirmed the significant
toxic contamination.
In light of these health hazards, a coalition of more than a
dozen civil rights, religious, and environmental justice groups peti-
tioned the EPA, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Reg-
istry (ATSDR), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(CDCP), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to
take immediate action to clean up the. toxic contamination.7" EPA
and ATSDR responded by saying they believed they had taken all
appropriate actions and that a cleanup was not necessary.7"
B. Community Cleanup
Residents decided that if state and federal agencies would not
take steps to clean up their neighborhoods, they would do it them-
selves. In an innovative partnership spearheaded by the Deep
South Center for Environmental Justice, environmental groups,
community organizations, and the United Steelworkers of America
staged an April 2006 community cleanup demonstration in New
Orleans East.7 2 At the cleanup, called A Safe Way Back Home,
health and safety specialists from the United Steelworkers of
America provided safety equipment and trained community mem-
bers in handling hazardous materials.73 Residents and volunteers
removed several inches of topsoil and sediment from neighbor-
hood yards and deposited them in an empty lot for FEMA removal;
they then replaced the soil with fresh sod and river sand."
A Safe Way Back Home is an example of the Principles of En-
vironmental Justice in action.75 Led by community groups, it
brought together religious, labor, and environmental organiza-
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Nat. Resources Defense Council, http://www.nrdc.org/health/effects/katrina
data/bywater.asp (last visited Oct. 6, 2006).
71 Id.
72 For more information about the project, see the website of the Deep South
Center for Environmental Justice, http://www.dscej.org/asafewayhome.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 6, 2006).
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 See Principles, supra note 9.
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tions and achieved direct results for the community of New Orle-
ans East, while drawing attention to the government's failure to
act. Additionally, it allowed resident participation in both clean-
ing-up their own community and protesting government decisions
and policy. Yet unlike the EPA and FEMA, community groups lack
resources to replicate their work on a larger scale. As Dr. Beverly
Wright, executive director of the Deep South Center for Environ-
mental Justice, stated, "Ultimately, it is the government's responsi-
bility to provide the resources required to address areas of
environmental concern and to assure that our communities are
safe and our families are protected." 6 Faced with government am-
bivalence, however, individuals used available local and national re-
sources to make essential changes in their community.
C. Dealing with Debris: Battling Over a Landfill
Another example of community action and empowerment is
found in the battle to eliminate the health risks associated with a
landfill in New Orleans East. In the spring of 2006, the Louisiana
Department of Environmental Quality (LDEQ) created a new land-
fill called Chef Menteur to house 2.6 million tons of debris from
homes and other structures demolished by Katrina. The landfill
was located directly adjacent to a Vietnamese immigrant neighbor-
hood and across a canal from the Bayou Sauvage National Wildlife
Refuge.77 Operated by Waste Management of Louisiana, the land-
fill was opened under an expedited permitting process through
emergency administrative orders after Katrina. Mayor Ray Nagin,
without a public hearing, waived local zoning regulations to issue a
conditional land-use permit for the landfill so it could be sited near
Village de l'Est, a residential area. 78 With conditional land-use ap-
proval, LDEQ issued a permit for an "enhanced construction-and-
demolition" landfill on the site, enabling the site to accept an ex-
panded definition of construction and demolition waste that in-
cluded the rotting contents and structural material of hurricane-
destroyed homes.79 The landfill contained potentially dangerous
home products such as petroleum, cleaning products, and pesti-
76 Press Release, Deep S. Cnr. for Envtl. Justice, A Safe Way Back Home (July 3,
2006), available at http://newreconstruction.civilrights.org/details.cfm?id=45043.
77 Leslie Eaton, A New Landfill in New Orleans Sets Off a Battle, N.Y. TIMES, May 8,
2006, at Al.
78 Id.
79 Press Release, La. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Chef Menteur Landfill Ok'd to Accept
C&D Waste (April 13, 2006), available at http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/portal/
portals/0/news/pdf/ChefMenteurLandfillfinal.pdf; see also Eaton, supra note 77.
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cides; yet operated without basic protections such as a clay liner to
prevent toxic leaching.
80
Local residents and community organizations objected vigor-
ously to the landfill's location. In April, they sought an injunction
against the Army Corps of Engineers to prevent its opening, but a
judge denied the request." Mayor Nagin briefly shut down the
landfill in May 2006 to allow testing of material dumped there, but
allowed it to reopen only two weeks later despite a testing process
that was highly criticized as ineffective.82 Finally, Mayor Nagin,
under significant political pressure from community members,
stated that he would allow the city's emergency land-use permit to
expire on August 14, 2006.83 In response to the expiration of the
conditional use permit, LDEQ was forced to revoke the operating
permit for the facility. Subsequently, Waste Management filed suit
against the LDEQ seeking an injunction to maintain the status
quo. Concerned Citizens for a Strong New Orleans, Louisiana En-
vironmental Action Network, and NRDC joined with local counsel
to intervene on behalf of community residents, urging closure of
the landfill. A Louisiana judge denied Waste Management's re-
quest for an injunction and the landfill was closed on August 14,
2006.4 In this case, although NRDC stepped in to offer legal sup-
port, community protests, media outreach, and advocacy were the
primary catalysts in closing Chef Menteur landfill.85 Despite this
victory, however, the problem of debris disposal remains.8 6
80 Wayne Curtis, A Heap of Sorrows, GRIsT MAG., Aug. 10, 2006, http://www.grist.
org/news/maindish/2006/08/10/curtis/.
81 La. Envtl. Action at Work. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, No. 06-2020, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 24344, at *1 (E.D.La. Apr. 27, 2006), available at http://www.
deq.louisiana.gov/portal/portals/O/news/pdf/ReasonsforJudgmentCD.pdf; see also
Press Release, La. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, Judge Rules Chef Menteur Landfill Can
Continue Operating (April 27, 2006), available at http://www.deq.louisiana.gov/
portal/portals/0/news/pdf/chefmenteurjudgerulingapri27.pdf.
82 Gordon Russell, Chef Menteur Landfill Testing Called a Farce, NEw ORLEANs TIMES-
PICAYUNE, May 26, 2006, at Al. Local groups suspected that politics played a role in
Nagin's agreement to shut the landfill temporarily, since he did so just before the
mayoral election and re-opened the facility immediately afterward. Id.
83 Curtis, supra note 80.
84 Leslie Eaton, New Orleans Mayor Closes a Disputed Landfill Used for Debris from Hur-
ricane, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 16, 2006, at Al.
85 Curtis, supra note 80.
86 Id. Curtis addresses concerns that the debris will simply go to other existing




IV. MATCHMAKERS FOR JUSTICE: A COMMUNITY
EMPOWERMENT INITIATIVE
In reaction to the tragedy of Hurricane Katrina and the result-
ing social and legal upheaval, a group of law students formed the
Student Hurricane Network.87 Initially, the organization helped
plan and execute student volunteer trips to the Gulf Coast for the
winter break during the 2005-2006 school year. These efforts have
grown into several initiatives, including a student lobbying project,
a disaster preparedness project, a remote research project, and the
pilot project that is the subject of this section: Matchmakers for
Justice.8
Matchmakers for Justice (Matchmakers) pairs residents dis-
placed by Hurricane Katrina with law students from across the
country89 who assist them in rebuilding their lives. The project's
goal is to help residents help themselves in the areas of housing,
employment, education, and health care. Students and residents
work together toward goals which allow residents to move back to
New Orleans and re-establish some level of normalcy. Since the
law students are not authorized to practice law, the main goals of
the project are advocacy and community empowerment. 90 The six-
week pilot project paired twenty-eight law students with twenty-
eight displaced residents.
The overall structure of the project provides support for the
law student-resident relationship and ensures that residents receive
the best possible results from the project. Faculty advisors from stu-
dents' law schools answered general questions about assisting the
87 See LAnA HLASS ET AL., LAW STUDENTS WORKING WITHIN THE POST-KATRINA LE-
GAL LANDSCAPE: THE STUDENT HURRICANE NETWORK ANNUAL REPORT 2005-2006 at
5-6 (2006), available at http://www.studenthurricanenetwork.org/shn-report-oct
%202006.pdf.
88 Id. at 35. Janell Smith, Co-Author of this Article, is the Resident Outreach Coor-
dinator of Matchmakers for Justice.
89 Law students from the following schools participated in the six-week pilot pro-
ject: American University School of Law, Florida State University School of Law, Ge-
orgetown Law School, Harvard Law School, Howard University School of Law, John
Marshall Law School, Mississippi College School of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center
at Louisiana State University, Seton Hall University School of Law, Southern Univer-
sity Law Center, South Texas College of Law, Texas Weselyan School of Law, Tulane
University School of Law, University of Baltimore Law School, UCLA School of Law,
University of Colorado, Boulder School of Law, University of Florida School of Law,
and the University of Houston Law Center. Id. at 35 n.109.
90 See Press Release, Matchmakers for Justice, Matchmakers for Justice Provides
Breakthrough Legal Resources for Residents Wronged by Katrina Failings (Sept. 11,
2006), available at http://www.studenthurricanenetwork.org/M4J-PressRelease9.11.
06.doc.
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residents, and members of a legal advisory board and a social work
advisory board provided direction and resources during weekly
conference calls with law students.9 The legal advisory board was
comprised of legal services attorneys, directors of pro bono pro-
grams at various law schools, and other attorneys from non-profit
organizations within the New Orleans community. The social work
advisory board consisted of social workers from New Orleans com-
munity organizations. Together, seven law students, three legal ad-
visory board members, and three social work advisory board
members formed a "cluster group." These weekly calls allowed stu-
dents to troubleshoot residents' issues and get feedback from pro-
fessionals in the field with knowledge of New Orleans resources.
From the project's official start on September 9, 2006, stu-
dents connected with residents in a way that was unique and em-
powering. First, the students met facetoface with residents at a
New Orleans training session, which gave students a comprehen-
sive history of the socio-economic situation in New Orleans before
the storm; counseled about how to interact with residents who face
poverty and discrimination; and introduced the various local and
state resources available. Second, for the duration of the pilot pro-
ject, law students from all over the country communicated with re-
sidents by phone to help them navigate government programs and
fill out paperwork. Third, the students gained the skills needed to
work with future clients, especially just hearing clients' needs and
determining workable solutions. Importantly, each step of this
process was orchestrated to allow residents to voice their needs and
for law students to react to them.
A recent article in the Tulane University electronic newsletter
highlighted one relationship between a first-year law student at Tu-
lane University School of Law and a displaced resident:
It's stressful because there is a lot I don't know about civil proce-
dure in Louisiana .... She has multi-faceted issues. I'm making
phone calls and working to locate resources on her behalf.
What surprises me the most is how some insurance companies
91 Matchmakers forJustice Community Partners include: Rhode Island Legal Ser-
vices, New Orleans Legal Assistance Corporation (NOLAC), Loyola Law Clinic,
NAACP, Southeast Legal Services, Law Offices of Colette Pichon Battle, The ProBono
Project, Mississippi Center forJustice, People's Institute for Survival and Beyond, Ad-
vocacy Project, The Louisiana Bar Association, ACRON, Common Ground, Hope
House, Mercy Corps, Neighborhood Housing Services, New Orleans Musicians Hurri-
cane Relief Fund, People's Hurricane Relief Fund, People's Organizing Committee,
United Front for Affordable Housing, Unity for Homeless, Moving Forward Gulf
Coast, Inc. as well as other local and national organizations. Ht.Ass ET AL, supra note
87, at 35 n.110.
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are acting toward New Orleans residents. But, despite all their
problems, the residents are optimistic.92
This testimonial represents a majority of the student-resident inter-
actions during the project's six-week duration. The students some-
times experienced challenges in meeting the needs of residents,
but each used the support structure of the advisory boards and
faculty advisors to address the issues of their individual residents.
The pilot project is currently in its evaluation stage and the
program coordinators are working on fine-tuning it for a possible
second phase. It is extremely important for coordinators to hear
from the law students and residents to determine which parts of
the project worked and which parts did not. Upon hearing the
feedback on the project, the coordinators will make informed deci-
sions on whether or not the project accomplished its goals of advo-
cacy and empowerment. Ultimately, the coordinators would like
residents to take over the program and help other residents to con-
front the issues that they face in the process of rebuilding. If re-
sidents actually play an active role in their own revitalization, then
they will be empowered to help other residents to move forward
from this tragedy.
V. LOOKING AHEAD: WORK TO BE DONE
Over a year after Katrina, current, former, and returning re-
sidents of New Orleans face a variety of problems in the long- and
short-term. The goals of environmental justice encompass dealing
with this array of needs-from adequate and affordable housing; to
ensuring people's return to safe schools and homes; to wetlands
restoration-and in the process, increasing community participa-
tion in political and corporate decision-making.93
Short-term problems, such as finding transitional housing
when FEMA assistance is no longer available, need immediate at-
tention.94 Organizations such as Common Ground Collective,
Matchmakers for Justice, and the People's Hurricane Relief Fund
Grassroots Legal Group are providing legal assistance and advocacy
92 Fran Simon, Matchmakers for Justice, THE NEW WAVE, October 24, 2006, http://
www2.tulane.edu/article-newsdetails.cfm?ArticlelD=6883.
93 See Cole, supra note 16, at 641 (discussing the "holistic view" of "third-wave"
environmentalists, who see "structural societal change as a way to alleviate many of the
problems-poverty, crime, joblessness, environmental degradation-their communi-
ties endure").
94 For information on legal campaigns regarding housing see, for example, Com-
mon Ground Collective, Legal Advocacy Team, http://www.commongroundrelief.
org/node/149 (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
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for individuals in collaboration with local legal aid providers, legal
clinics at Loyola and Tulane University Schools of Law, and volun-
teers from around the country.95 They are helping individuals con-
test insurance claim denials; fight evictions from both transitional
and more permanent housing; counter police misconduct and bru-
tality; and seek remedies for fraudulent or other bad practices by
contractors. 9 6 Here, legal assistance provides a way to meet peo-
ple's needs, as well as involve community members in the organiza-
tions' larger projects.
In the medium- and long-term, residents still seek a cleanup
and rebuilding plan that provides for the needs of the community
and the natural environment. NRDC and its local partners con-
tinue to monitor for toxic pollution and have completed an assess-
ment of drinking water that will surely lead to further advocacy. 97
As demolition continues, NRDC is advocating for recycling and
safe, efficient disposal of waste. Perhaps most importantly, the fu-
ture rebuilding of New Orleans poses many issues in which advo-
cates continually need to be involved. Community groups and
tenant organizations are advocating to include affordable housing
in the rebuilding plan and partnering with a Loyola law clinic to
fight city efforts to shut down a large portion of the city's public
housing.9" Another looming question is how to prevent a similarly
devastating flood from occurring; innovative wetlands restoration
and protection must be a part of this plan.99 In the meantime,
local and international organizations are collaborating on efforts
to use green building techniques whenever possible in the huge
amount of construction necessary to rebuild New Orleans. 00
Although national media attention to the Gulf Coast area has
diminished, local organizations and residents still need outside re-
sources and support to complete their important work. The follow-
ing recommendations-based on the experience of the authors,
their mentors, and community partners, as well as the innovative
work of many social justice lawyers"' -provide some guidance to
95 Common Ground Collective, Free Legal Clinic, http://www.commonground
relief.org (last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
96 Id.
97 Results of study on file with author.
98 See CommonGround.org, http://www.commongroundrelief.org/node/149
(last visited Dec. 1, 2006).
99 See, e.g., Cornelia Dean, Corps Proposal for ,ulf Draws Criticism From Scientists, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2006, at F2.
100 See GlobalGreen.org, Healthy Homes and Smart Neighborhoods Response
Team, http://www.globalgreen.org/greenbuilding/neworleans/rebuild.html.
101 See generally, Quigley, supra note 15; Cole, supra note 16; GERALD LOPEZ, REBEL,
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attorneys and other advocates interested in joining the movement.
VI. LESSONS FOR ATTORNEYS AND OTHERS SEEKING TO
EMPOWER COMMUNITIES
A. Let Community Leaders Lead
Local organizations and residents understand the social and
political landscape of their communities, and they are personally
affected by the problems they seek to address. Their goals should
guide attorneys' work at each step.'1 2 Projects must be structured
in a way that facilitates community leadership, decision-making,
and advocacy. Community members lacking the technical exper-
tise of lawyers can participate fully-and more effectively-in non-
legal advocacy. Further, attorneys must understand where commu-
nity members are coming from and respect decisions that might
differ from their advice. For example, people may mistrust govern-
ment based on personal experience, and attorneys should acknowl-
edge that mistrust, understand its causes, and keep it in mind when
fashioning strategies.
B. Organize, Organize, Organize
When advocating outside the legal system, one of the greatest
strengths communities have is numbers. Attorneys working with
local organizations must be willing to bring in all concerned par-
ties regardless of income or race. Developing new and creative
partnerships is key: An environmental law attorney may not be
used to working with labor organizations or church leaders, but
these organizations represent a great number of people who share
the interests. When reaching out to these organizations, however,
attorneys should check in with the local community first to ac-
knowledge and respect existing alliances or divisions. In addition,
LIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO'S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992); Ste-
phen Ellmann, Client-Centerdness Multiplied: Individual Autonomy and Collective
Mobilization in Public Interest Lauyers' Representation of Groups, 78 VA. L. REv. 1103
(1992).
102 See, e.g., ADvocs. FOR ENVTL. HuMAN RIGHTS, ET. AL., REBUILDING NEW ORLEANS:
A TEN-POINT PLAN OF ACTION 1 (2005), available at http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/
katrina/leg_06011001a.pdf. NRDC signed on to the Plan along with Advocates for
Environmental Human Rights; Alliance for Healthy Homes; Deep South Center for
Environmental Justice; Healthy Schools Network; Holy Cross Neighborhood Associa-
tion; Interreligious Foundation for Community Organization/Pastors for Peace; Loui-
siana Environmental Action Network; National Black Environmental Justice Network;
Natural Resources Defense Council; 9/11 Environmental Action; People's Hurricane
Relief Fund; Physicians for Social Responsibility-Louisiana; and Sierra Club Delta
Chapter. Id.
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organizing puts a human face on the issues: Political entities and
the media respond to human stories, not technical arguments.
Working with people who are directly affected is also essential to
community acceptance of the project's goals. Finally, attorneys ac-
customed to court rules and discovery schedules may become frus-
trated with ad hoc organizing methods.103 Although this type of
advocacy requires a longer-term commitment, attorneys can re-
main consistently involved throughout.
C. Use Non-Legal As Well As Legal Strategies
There are many advantages to non-legal remedies. Commu-
nity empowerment is stronger when people are active in the advo-
cacy. The media are just as, if not more, responsive to press
releases, protests, and organizing as they are to legal action. Litiga-
tion is often costly and time-consuming, frustrating the more im-
mediate needs and goals of the community. Since courts have not
been open to environmental justice litigation, as non-legal avenues
are often more likely to be successful. 104 In addition, non-legal so-
lutions based on the neighborhood and its political structures are
often more responsive to community needs than traditional legal
action.
If legal action is part of the advocacy, attorneys should be
open to structuring it in a non-traditional way to serve larger orga-
nizational goals. Within the limits of ethical obligations, for exam-
ple, attorneys can time the filing of a lawsuit to correspond with
other advocacy activities. Legal remedies should be one tool to
solve intermediate problems, rather than the only tool in the advo-
cacy plan. For example, legal advocacy at the administrative level
may be the best way to get an extension on a community member's
unemployment insurance or prevent an eviction, but a project
should not be structured around the provision of those intermedi-
ate legal services.
CONCLUSION
This Article provides several examples of community empow-
erment and involvement in legal advocacy efforts after Hurricane
Katrina in New Orleans. When legal and non-legal advocates col-
laborate with an involved citizenry, the community is empowered.
103 See Quigley, supra note 15, at 475-76 (discussing attorneys' expectation that they
can control interactions based on experience in a controlled courtroom
environment).
104 See supra Part.II.
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The examples in this Article demonstrate how the horrific after-
math of Hurricane Katrina can be overcome through community
partnership and collaboration. The issues facing Gulf Coast re-
sidents can become the issues of any community in the United
States or elsewhere. We hope to encourage attorneys and other
professionals to look beyond their professional community service
requirements to more-involved work that not only serves the com-
munity, but also empowers the community, leading to social
change.

